B. DELINEATING PUBLICITY EXPLOITATION
Before exploring solutions it is first necessary to set out the problem. This involves a detailed examination of what is involved in publicity exploitation in practice.
Regardless of jurisdiction or legal system, publicity practice in the Western world involves the use of some identifying feature of the individual in order to promote or publicise a product, service or event. Thus, the twin elements to be defined are use and subject matter.
(1) Use
While writers have devised a range of categories reflecting the types of exploitation practised, the essential nature of this exploitation can be reduced to three categories: media use; promotion and advertising; and merchandising.
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Each can be illustrated by recent high-profile examples. Media use is exemplified by Jennifer Lopez's exclusive licence to People magazine in 2008 for publication of photographs of her new-born twins. The fee was (allegedly) $6 million. 6 What gave rise to the high fee was not the publication of photographs of twins, but the combined fact that their mother was one of the most famous female pop and R&B singers in the US and that the publication rights were exclusive. Similarly, of all the weddings that took place in 2008, the only one that generated a fee of £2.5 million for the right to exclusive magazine coverage was that of Wayne Rooney and Coleen McLoughlin. Alongside the exclusive photographs there is usually an exclusive interview. This use therefore relies on images and information about the individual, typically in an exclusive deal.
Promotion use focuses on advertising and promotion deals, such as David Beckham's advertising and endorsement of products as diverse as soft drinks (for Pepsi) and sport-related products such as football boots (for Adidas). Here the company is paying for the individual to "tell . . . the relevant public that he approves of the product or service or is happy to be associated with it. In effect he adds his name as an encouragement to members of the relevant public to buy or use the service or product." 7 Where an individual advertises something related to his particular fame or expertise, it can be referred to as a "tools of the 5 Writers typically recognise variations on these categories, but the essentials can be reduced to these three practices: see O Goodenough, "Retheorising privacy and publicity" [1997 trade" endorsement. But whether the promotion is a "tools" or "non-tools" one, the individual is promoting the goods and services of a third party rather than a business of his own. Often, however, there is an element of self-promotion, for celebrities will usually ensure that the brands that they advertise and endorse fit their own image and profile.
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Merchandising use can be illustrated by the vast number of calendars, t-shirts, mugs, posters and so forth featuring the names and images of pop, film and sports stars. 9 Here the individual becomes the product: the purchaser does not buy a Kylie Minogue calendar because he needs a calendar and trusts Ms Minogue to get the dates right; he buys it because it bears images of her. The individual is demonstrating his support for and allegiance to the individual by purchasing an "image carrier". 10 In Irvine v Talksport, 11 Laddie J contrasted merchandising with the endorsement or promotion use in relation to "the sale of memorabilia relating to the late Diana, Princess of Wales":
A porcelain plate bearing her image could hardly be thought of as being endorsed by her, but the enhanced sales which may be achieved by virtue of the presence of the image is a form of merchandising.
When there is public use of an individual's name or image, that use can be reduced to one of the categories just described: it will concern exploitation either in the media, or through the promotion or advertisement of goods or services, or by way of merchandising when the name or image is attached to goods.
In all cases, the use must be public. Private use may give rise to distinct legal issues, but it is not relevant to the question of publicity. The requirement for public use is implicit in each of the three uses discussed above: none could be achieved by keeping the relevant publication, promotion or merchandising private. Public use does not, however, equate to commercial or for-profit use, since a charity or other non-profit organisation could make use of an individual to promote its cause without seeking directly to raise income. "Persona", Professor McCarthy suggests, is preferable as the collective term for the elements of human identity exploited, since "the traditional phrase 'name and likeness' was inadequate to describe the many aspects of a person which can identify him or her". 14 The all-embracing notion of what is covered by a right of publicity in the US is reflected in state legislative codes which provide for a right of publicity or commercial exploitation of identity.
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The approach taken in the European Civilian traditions has been synthesised by Johann Neethling, who refers to the "appropriation of a person's identity (name or likeness)". 16 "Identity" is then defined -in the context of the (separate) right to identity 17 -as a person's "uniqueness which individualizes him as a particular person and this distinguishes him from others . . . Identity is manifested in various indicia by which a person can be recognized, such as his name, image, voice, fingerprints, handwriting, etc." 18 The key idea which emerges is recognisability. David Vaver also turns to the idea of identification and recognition, which is present in both the European and the American interpretations of identity, noting that "' [l] Recognisability and identification, therefore, are central aspects of the exploitation of the individual in publicity practice. But while some element of recognisability, and thus reputation, is common, it is not essential. Some of the earliest American cases involved use of photographs of unknown individuals in advertisements. 20 Moreover, even where there is a reputation, there is no requirement for it to be positive: Ryanair famously used the image of Charles Ingram to promote cheap flights if one needed to leave the country quickly.
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Although reputation is likely to be a significant element in most publicity exploitation, it is not determinative. One reason for this is that it can never be the sole element exploited. Reputation -or fame or celebrity -is intangible and must therefore be represented through tangible elements of the individual. Thus image, name, voice or other iconic assets are necessary. Since all individuals have a name, image and voice, all individuals can potentially be exploited in this way. In this article, the term "individual" will be used to refer to the person who is the subject of publicity exploitation, whether or not the person is a celebrity.
A final element in publicity exploitation is to ask whether the individual consented. Was the exploitation authorised or unauthorised? In the absence of a clear right to grant or withhold consent, this question may seem unnecessary. Nevertheless, it is very relevant in practical terms. Authorised exploitation generates a higher income for the individual. For example, Douglas v Hello! 22 reveals that, whereas the Douglases were awarded less than £15,000 by the High Court in compensation for Hello!'s unauthorised publication of their wedding photographs, the value of their licence with OK! for exclusive publication rights was £1 million. In cases of authorised use, the legal issue will focus on the right granted by the individual; in cases of unauthorised use, the concern is with the rights infringed, if any, in relation both to the individual and to any authorised parties. Again, the Douglases' wedding illustrates this, since the subsequent litigation against Hello! was raised not only by the Douglases but also by OK!, their authorised publisher.
(3) Some terminology
In the discussion that follows, "publicity" will be taken to comprise the public use of an individual's persona in the media information, promotion and merchandising uses; and "persona" will be used to denote the identifying elements of an individual -commonly image and name -which are representative of the intangible reputation, where one exists. Where a distinction needs to be drawn between exploitation which has the consent of the individual and that which does not, the terms "authorised" and "unauthorised" will be used.
C. OBSERVATIONS FROM ABROAD
Since exploitation of publicity and celebrity is a world-wide activity, it is helpful to consider in brief how other jurisdictions have responded to the practice. More particularly, by considering two different responses, it will be possible to draw out two conclusions which are relevant to Scots law. The first concerns the problem of property, illustrated by the US approach; the second is the tension between commerce and dignity, for which guidance can be drawn from the Civilian systems of Europe.
(
1) Publicity rights as property rights
America is generally recognised as having the earliest publicity right -perhaps not surprising in a nation which is home to Hollywood and Broadway. Celebrity culture and the commercialisation of celebrity image resulted in affronts to privacy, 24 which in time evolved into publicity claims. The case which is credited with first recognising a publicity right is Haelan Laboratories v Topps Chewing Gum Inc, 25 decided in 1953. The plaintiff had a contract with a baseball player for the exclusive right to use his image on cards in connection with sales of the plaintiff's chewing gum. When the player subsequently entered into a contract with the defendant for the same purpose, the plaintiff sued. What is particularly Vol 14 2010 publicity and image rights in scots law 371 interesting is that the action was raised against the commercial rival not the errant player. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit allowed recovery, with the words of Judge Frank giving rise to a new field of law: 26 We think that, in addition to and independent of the right of privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph . . . Whether it be labelled a "property" right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag "property" simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has a pecuniary worth.
Today the property status of publicity in the US is assured, despite the problems it sometimes engenders. Could Scots law protect interests in persona in a similar manner? If persona is to be owned, it must, of course, be capable of classification as a "thing". But even if a wide notion of "thing" is accepted -Neil MacCormick, for example, would include not only horses and houses but also rights such as shares in a company 27 -it seems improbable that this could extend to persona, at least in Scotland. For the essence of "things", Professor MacCormick continues, is that they are "conceived as durable objects existing separately from and independently of other objects and of persons, subject to being used, possessed, and enjoyed by persons, and capable of being transferred from one person to another without loss of identity as that very thing".
28 A "thing", on this view, must meet the criteria of durability, separability and transferability.
Persona does not sit easily with MacCormick's definition. Only the durability criterion presents no problems (at least during life): both separability and transferability do. It is meaningless to talk of one's image, for example, as separate or separable from one's corporeal body or as capable of transfer without loss of identity. The whole notion of persona is so intricately bound up with the individual that to attempt to separate out, and transfer on, the constituent (and intangible) elements of a publicity right seems hardly possible. The relationship between persona and the individual is fundamental -and, James Penner would argue, fatal, since "for a thing to be held as property, we must not conceive of it as an aspect of ourselves or our ongoing personality-rich relationships to others".
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There are also practical objections. If persona were to be treated as a thing in Scots law, it would be subject to the usual consequences of property ownership. Thus it could be assigned outright (not simply licensed) or used to satisfy the claims of a creditor. Yet to contend that persona could form part of an individual's estate on bankruptcy fails to reflect the reality of the situation. The considerable problems experienced in the US in this respect have been examined by Westfall and Landau, who conclude that "it seems relatively clear that publicity rights should not be treated as property for purposes of bankruptcy". 30 Yet, at least in Scotland, it is difficult to see how persona could be property for some purposes but not for others.
Persona, by its very definition, is an inherent part of each individual, 31 inseparable and non-transmissible without loss of identity -quite literally, in this case. By failing to meet the criteria for thinghood, it falls outside the scope of ownership in Scots law. In short, a property law solution will not do.
(2) Publicity rights as personality rights
To use personal indicia of identity for commercial exploitation creates a tension which lies at the heart of all legal and theoretical discourse surrounding publicity. 32 How should law respond to a practice which has a strong commercial element yet deals in something inherently unique and personal to each individual? Is it a privacy and human rights concern or does it relate to property rights and goodwill? As the previous section has demonstrated, persona could not be the subject of ownership in Scots law. An alternative approach would be to consider whether personality rights offer appropriate protection. Jurisdictions such as France and Germany provide an insight into how the commercial/dignitarian tension can be resolved by way of such rights.
Personality rights are "a separate category of rights, distinguishable from real, personal and immaterial property rights". 33 Long familiar in Civil law jurisdictions, 34 the term is now beginning to gain currency in Scotland. 35 Where publicity rights are treated as a subset of personality rights there is likely to be an emphasis on the dignitarian aspects, for concepts such as privacy and human dignity are central to any legal protection of personality. This means that the commercial significance of infringement in publicity situations may be marginalised. The end result is that in many cases only solatium will be available, and thus "the courts deny adequate compensation in the most serious cases of personality right infringement". 36 Although Civilian jurisdictions treat publicity within the framework of personality rights, the way in which they do so varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This reflects the tension between commerce and dignity, forcing courts and legislature to reconcile two opposing interests, for "while the attributes of human personality, like name, reputation, image, voice, and privacy, have traditionally been seen as extra-patrimonial rights without monetary value, today these rights are being increasingly patrimonialized and brought into commerce". 37 The result has been described as a "patrimonialized extrapatrimonial right", 38 which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and which may be either "monistic" or "dualistic". 39 The dualistic model uses two different rights, one positive and patrimonial, the other negative and extra-patrimonial, to protect the interests in exploitation and protection of publicity. 40 This can be seen for example in French law, where a distinction is made between the right to one's image, which is an "inherent part of the person", and the right over one's image, which is "a commodity to be exploited". 41 The consequence is that "a general personality right does not fit into French law." 42 Instead, protection is achieved through dual rights protecting material and subjective interests respectively. 43 Under the monistic approach, which is favoured, for example, in Germany, 44 a single right, the general personality right, 45 protects both the economic and the edinburgh law review Vol 14 2010 the dignitarian interests in publicity. This was specifically addressed by the Bundesgerichtshof in the Marlene Dietrich case, 46 brought by Dietrich's daughter against a producer who had sold various items of "Marlene" merchandising. In reaching its decision, the court "stressed the two aspects of the personality right which protected not only ideal, but also economic interests". 47 Consequently, unauthorised use of name, image or reputation could give rise to a claim for damages or unjustified enrichment, as well as to claims for solatium.
The Civilian jurisdictions show that a personality right can both respect an individual's autonomy and dignity in his persona while at the same time recognising persona's commercial significance. But personality rights are too undeveloped in Scotland for this to be a plausible model to follow.
D. SCOTTISH RESPONSES
How then does Scots law deal with publicity? The short answer is that it does not. Although the commercial practice exists, the academic and legal analyses are under-theorised. There is no statute which regulates publicity use of persona, nor have there been any recent cases -although there are two older cases which could arguably be classed as involving publicity rights.
(1) Early cases
The first case is Wilkie v McCulloch & Co, decided in 1823 and reported only briefly. 48 The pursuer, Wilkie, invented a new species of plough which, although he had no patent in respect of it, bore his name. The defenders manufactured plough boards, which they sold with the name "Wilkie" or "Wilkie's newest pattern" stamped upon them. Wilkie's claim was that "although he had not the exclusive privilege of making and vending these improved ploughs, yet he was entitled, at common law, to prevent any one from impressing his name on those which were not made by him, or under his authority". 49 The First Division adhered to the interdict granted by the Lord Ordinary to prevent the defenders from so doing. This offered Wilkie protection which was based, not on his interest in the plough (which had not been copied), but on his name. Unfortunately, the legal basis for this judgment is obscure, thus limiting its utility. The second case arose eighty years later. In McCosh v Crow, 50 Mr McCosh's daughters sat for studio photographs, copies of which were duly bought by McCosh. However, enlargements of the photographs were made and displayed on the walls of the studio. Although McCosh apparently had no objection to this while the studio was owned by the original photographer, once it had been sold to Crow he requested that the images be taken down and, when Crow refused, successfully sued for interdict to prevent the photographs from being exhibited. The Second Division held that the right to take photographs depended on the agreement of the customer and that the resulting contract was a confidential one which would be breached where the images were displayed against the customer's wishes. 51 While there are undoubtedly privacy-and confidentialityrelated concerns here, there is also a publicity consideration, in respect of the public display of lawfully-taken photographs. Moreover, the words of Lord Young, dissenting, echo the objections still raised today against publicity rights: "Monthly, weekly, or indeed daily experience of drawings published in this and other countries shews that the law does not readily recognise the exhibition and publication of likenesses as actionable".
(2) Contemporary models
Despite these early cases involving the unauthorised use of name and image, there is little evidence of their subsequent application. The question thus remains: how should Scots law regulate publicity? 53 The answer depends on the key characteristics, in law, of publicity exploitation. As the previous section made clear, publicity exploitation involves the public use of an individual's persona in the media, promotion or merchandising. The subject matter of this use, persona, gives rise to the two fundamental propositions which shape the legal analysis. One is that persona, as an inherent part of the individual, is not capable of being owned; the other is that there is a tension between commercial exploitation and the dignitarian interests which are at the heart of publicity rights.
It is apparent from the discussion above that ownership of the individual's name and image is not an option in Scots law. The same is true of the use of personality rights, at least in the full-blown sense in which such rights are 50 (1903) 
(a) Passing off
The first option is passing off. This delict protects the goodwill in a business name and brand, where the pursuer can prove the three elements of goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage. In the English case of Irvine v Talksport, 54 Eddie Irvine, the F1 racing driver, successfully sued Talksport Radio on the basis of passing off for its unauthorised use of his image in a publicity brochure. The use of passing off in this context has been extensively criticised. 55 A further problem is that, arguably, Irvine's success depended on the fact that Talksport had doctored his photograph. While Talksport had obtained the picture legally, from an image bank, it had altered it so that, instead of listening intently on a mobile phone, Irvine was listening intently to a Talksport-branded radio. It was this which created the misrepresentation and thus the link in the minds of recipients between Irvine and Talksport. It seems significant that no action was taken by Irvine against Talksport's use of another photograph in the same brochure which had not been doctored. This suggests that passing off would fail to protect where a photograph alone is used, without the image being either doctored or accompanied by a statement which created a false connection between the individual and the company (such as "This man loves our Acme widgets"). A further hurdle for prospective pursuers is that passing off protects goodwill, so that where the individual has no established goodwill then this doctrine has nothing to offer. In summary, while Irvine v Talksport raises the possibility that individuals whose persona is used without consent could sue for compensation in delict, it also bars the way for those who have no goodwill (non-celebrities) or where there is no misrepresentation.
(b) Privacy
A second option is privacy. While this has been developed extensively in the English courts, in a post-Human Rights Act world, to refine breach of confidence and article 8 privacy rights, the Scottish jurisprudence is considerably more limited. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine the Court of Session overlooking the speeches of the House of Lords in cases such as Campbell v MGN, 56 where Lord Nicholls stated that in privacy cases the action for breach of confidence "has now firmly shaken off the limited constraint of the need for an initial confidential relationship . . . The essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private information."
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Where an individual's private information, including images and other indicia, is used in breach of the article 8 right to privacy or in breach of confidence, a right of recovery will almost certainly lie in the Scottish courts. Regardless of the merits of this development, 58 however, it is only of limited use in publicity cases. Most critically, it will not arise where there is nothing inherently private in what has been used, other than the fact that it contains a representation of the individual by way of name, image, voice, or other indicia. Only where there was a reasonable expectation of privacy -which was not outweighed by the article 10 right to freedom of expression -will privacy assist. Breach of confidence presents a separate but closely-related ground, which arises where the image or information in question was disclosed in breach of an obligation of confidence. Again, defences are possible, such as the public interest in the information in question.
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A fictional example shows the limits of passing off and privacy in this context. Imagine an advertising campaign run by a brewer. This uses a photograph of Andy Murray celebrating his first win at Wimbledon, to which the brewer has added the caption "Our beer makes you feel this good". It is not obvious that there is any infringement of Murray's privacy, for the image was taken at a very public event and Murray can have had no expectation of privacy in respect of it. Nor is there any evident claim of passing off unless there is a misrepresentation suggesting a connection between Murray and the beer. Indeed advertisers can take steps to alleviate any risk by using wording which emphasises that the individual featured If and when the law in Scotland responds to publicity rights, 69 it seems most likely to do so by ad hoc development, along the lines of similar ad hoc development in England. Shared legislation on human rights and data protection paves the way for the use of English authority in privacy cases, while commercial interests dictate that pursuers in Scotland would be likely to attempt to follow the example of passing off set by Irvine. The prospect can hardly be described as attractive. Piecemeal development would involve cases being shoehorned into the nearest available cause of action, while the low incidence of litigation risks inconsistent or unprincipled development. Not only is the pursuer ill-served by such an approach, but the defender also stands to lose, since defences will not be developed or examined according to the parameters of publicity use but according to the defences for the original cause of action. For these reasons it is important that Scots law should seek to take a principled approach to the reality of publicity exploitation and, since existing causes of action offer only partial protection, the question arises whether there is a more appropriate home for a right to use and control persona.
E. EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGE
While persona cannot be a thing subject to ownership, there is another right, often classified as real, which does not require a thing. Exclusive privilege is a monopoly right, 70 "an exclusive, and valuable, right to do something and, hence, to stop others from doing the same thing". 71 Adam Smith classified exclusive privileges as real rights through an analogy with the rights of an heir to inherit: "[i]f therefore we account the right of inheritance to be a real right, as it certainly is, all other exclusive priviledges will for the same reason be accounted real rights". 72 Exclusive privileges were commonly seen as evils, "contrary to the great charter of our liberties", 73 which damaged the interests of traders through the "three incidents of a monopoly, the increase of price, the diminution of quality, and the impoverishing artificers in other traders by such increase, and diminution multiplying the difficulties in the maintenance of their families".
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(1) From government to commerce Some of the earliest examples of exclusive privilege related to the exercise of royal and feudal powers. In addition to the powers exercised by the monarch (described by one French observer as "great and extraordinary privileges"), 75 other officeand land-holders in Scotland had powers to prosecute crimes and levy taxes. Lords of Regality, for example, enjoyed the exclusive privilege to levy and collect taxes upon their lands for the King's officers. According to Kames: "This exclusive privilege, in whatever manner introduced, came to be fully established in lords of regality, as will appear from the act 5. parl. 1440, and act 26. parl. 1449". 76 These privileges were powers to exercise functions which are nowadays exercised by central or local government. Seemingly they owed their existence to Acts of Parliament rather than to any common law or feudal rights. Over time, however, the notion of exclusive privilege began to evolve so that, at least by the eighteenth century, a privilege was more likely to denote a right enjoyed in relation to commerce, notably by a Guild or incorporation of craftsmen. There is evidence of considerable litigation between these Guilds and outsiders, with the Guilds seeking to protect their monopoly interest from non-members who wished to enjoy the protected right to trade. Records exist of litigation in relation to the privileges of, among others, barbers and surgeons, 77 bonnetmakers, shoemakers and tailors, 78 merchants, 79 waulkers, 80 the Society of Writers to the Signet, 81 and of course the royal burghs, which had trading privileges granted by charter. 82 A typical clause constituting such an exclusive privilege is given by Kames as: 83 Vol 14 2010 publicity and image rights in scots law 381
That the burgesses shall have free liberty of commerce; and that there shall be liberty of admitting bakers, tailors, shoemakers & c. with power to the said artificers to exercise their respective crafts, as freely as is done in other burghs.
To exclusive privilege was also attributed rights as diverse as the monopoly right to create port and ferry facilities, 84 the right to hunt down game once the chase has started, 85 and the right of an heir between the death of the last proprietor and the inheritance. 86 The importance of exclusive privilege to commerce can be illustrated by the views of an English jurist, John Dyer Collier, writing in 1803. The evil of monopolies, Collier wrote, had evolved into a mainstay of commerce. "[I]n England monopolies did not deviate from their ordinary character of artifice; but that, by the wisdom of the nation, this poison of the state has been deprived of all its pernicious ingredients, and has been converted into a nutritious aliment, applicable to the support of commercial prosperity." 87 Alongside intangible trade rights, exclusive privilege was applied to intangible property rights -to copyright and patents. 88 Hector MacQueen has observed that in Scotland "the firm view came to be that copyright was not a right of property but a form of statutory monopoly, restricting for reasons of public policy what would otherwise be the natural liberties of mankind". 89 In the eighteenth century, however, the classification of intellectual property was not fixed either as "property" or as "privilege". Morison's Dictionary of Decisions, for example, records a number of cases under the heading "Literary Property", some of which related to the right of the author in works which were intended to remain unpublished and were not therefore covered by the Statute of Anne 1710. 90 The historical debate may partly be coloured by the increasing use of the language of property in the nineteenth century, as the market economy grew in importance. This gave rise to a "back-reading", 91 according to Ronan Deazley, and encouraged the idea that the Statute of Anne had been passed to protect the labour of authors and their property in that labour. In doing so, the Statute Vol 14 2010 publicity and image rights in scots law 383
(2) Publicity as exclusive privilege
As has been shown, publicity is a difficult right to classify, in part because of the tension caused by its commercial and its dignitarian facets. Neither ownership nor personal right can capture the complexity of a right which is inseparable from its holder but good against the world, which is personal to the individual but of considerable commercial importance, and which can be licensed but not assigned. A much more convincing classification of publicity in Scots law is as a right of exclusive privilege. While personal rights may be used to enforce an individual's right against a particular party, the right of publicity needs to be good against the world and capable of being licensed. This would suggest that publicity is a real right. Yet the real right of ownership cannot be engaged, since persona is not a "thing". Thus, publicity use of persona falls most appropriately into the category of rights of exclusive privilege, which recognises real rights in monopolies without the need for a thing. Support for this analysis can be drawn from the case, already mentioned, which created the right of publicity in America, Haelan Laboratories v Topps Chewing Gum Inc. 97 While the focus has typically been placed on the property implications of Judge Frank's words, quoted above, the full quotation reads: "We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture. . . "
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A further advantage of attributing the right to exploit persona through publicity to an exclusive privilege relates to the authorised/unauthorised distinction drawn above. Whereas the focus of this article has been primarily on actions to address unauthorised use, exclusive privilege provides for both. Thus, on the one hand, unauthorised use of persona would be a breach of the monopoly right; on the other, the right could be licensed by the individual, in a manner similar to the licence of intellectual property rights, thereby enabling authorised exploitation.
The question then arises how a right of exclusive privilege in persona might be recognised in Scots law. It is suggested that any such right would require to be statutory. 99 The main rights of exclusive privilege still in evidence today have their basis in statute. Whether classed as a right of exclusive privilege or as property subject to ownership, intellectual property rights arise from statutory grants, and 
